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An insured passenger leaped from the plane which had scarcely left the
ground, in Gits v. New York Life. s He was granted his double indemnity
although his clause excepted death from "engaging in submarine or aeronautic
operations."
III. Accidents to Pilots
The pilot is both engaging and participating in aeronautics. This is
equally true of an individual operating a glider. In Irwin v. Prudential
Insurance Co.19 the insured, pilot and sole occupant of a glider, was held
to be engaged in aviation operations.
In several instances, a pilot has sought an advantage from the "in time
of war" phrase. He obtained it in Charette v. Prudential Insurance Co.
20
where his double indemnity clause excluded death as a result of "having
been engaged in aviation or submarine operations or in military or in naval
services in time of war."
21
IV. Miscellaneous Decisions
Louisiana does not recognize an aviation exclusion clause, holding it to
be in conflict with the incontestable clause and statute.22 Other states have
held to the contrary. 23
An airplane is not a "motor drawn car" within the purview of an accident
policy listing a series of conveyances.2 4 Nor is a ship taking individuals up
for short hops "a public conveyance provided by a common carrier," in the
same sort of policy listing a series of conveyances. 25 But a corporation
providing regular flying service is a common carrier. 26
RECOVERY FOR TORTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
By DONALD J. FARAGE*
Effect of the Marital Status on Contracts and Crimes at Common Law
A brief survey of the legal attributes surrounding the spouses at common
law may be helpful in discussing present problems involving the marital
status. One very soon learns that many of the difficulties and concepts which
have a role in the field of contracts and crimes, where marital status is
involved, also appears prominently in the tort field.
The early concept that, "upon marriage, a man and woman merged, in
legal contemplation, and became one, that one being the husband" was so
18 (C. C. A. 7, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 7.
10 (1933) 5 Fed. Supp. 382.
20 (1930) 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848.
21 Accord, Peters v. Prudential Insurance Co., (1929) 133 Misc. 780, 233 N. Y. S.
500. Contrary results, on this point, were reached in Taylor v. Prudential Insurance
Co., (1931) 253 N. Y. S. 55, and Price v. Prudential Insurance Co., (1929) 98 Fla.
1044, 124 So. 817.
22 Leidenger (Bernier) v. Pacific Mutual, (1932) 139 So. 629.
23 Pacific Mutual v. Fishback, (Wash., 1933) 17 Pac. (2d) 841; American Home
Foundation v. Canada Life, (1931) 260 N. Y. S. 106 (citing Metropolitan v. Conway,
(1930) 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642, leading case on the point).
24Monroe's Admr. v. Federal Union Life, (Ky., 1933) 65 S. W. (2d) 680.
25 North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts., (1925) 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21; Brown
v. Pacific Mutual, (C. C. C. 5, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 996.
20 Curtis-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, (C. C. A. 3, 1933) 66 Fed. (2d) 710.
* Professor of law, Dickinson Law School.
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well established at common law that its authoritative source is difficult of
ascertainment. On the basis of this "unity" theory, at any rate, it was firmly
established at common law, that a married woman could not contract for
herself so as to be able to pursue a legal remedy on the contract, for any
breach by the other party.' It followed, therefore, that just as a wife
couldn't contract with a stranger, she could not contract2 with her husband
or be his valid grantee. 3 Likewise, a husband could not recover on a contract
made with his wife.4
In the field of crimes, the common law carried the "unity theory" so far
that a wife could not be guilty of a crime in respect to property of her
husband.5 As for the husband, upon his marriage all the wife's personal
property (except her separate, equitable estate) became his to dispose of at
pleasure, as well as all personal property subsequently acquired by the wife.6
Therefore since, he owned all of the wife's property, he could never be guilty
of stealing or embezzling it.
Curiously, however, the common law did not adhere rigidly to the unity
theory so far as crimes against the person of the other spouse were concerned.
A dictum was uttered by Blackburn in Philips v. Barnet 7 to the effect that
from the criminal standpoint, spouses were separate persons. This dictum
was very generally followed. s -lowever, traces may still be found in a
number of cases where a spouse is absolved of guilt for what was otherwise
a crime against the person of the other spouse on the strength of the unity
theory.9 The general trend, however, was to abandon the unity theory in
cases of crimes against the person.
As for the much talked about "right" of a husband at common law to
chastise his wife, it is difficult to ascertain definitely the source of the theory.
Coleridge in the case of In re Cochrane,' 0 attributes the dicta to Bacon. At
any rate, Queen v. Jackson," definitely settled the law that no such right of
chastisement, on the part of the husband, exists. That rule has been followed
in the United States.12
The Effect of the Marital Relation at Common Law upon Tort Actions
Brought By and Against Strangers
Just as a wife's right to sue a third party on a contract was recognized
only if the husband joined in the suit, so the wife's right to sue a third party
for torts was upheld only if her husband joined as plaintiff.' 3 But this
' Prat v. Taylor, K. B. Croke's Reports, Eliz. 61 (1791). See Blackstone Comm.
442, 443; Coke Litt. 1126.2Gay v. Kingsley, 11 Allen 345 (1865).
3 Firebrass on Demise of Jane Symes (widow) v. Pennant, 2 Wilson 254 (1763).
4 See dicta in Gay v. Kingsley (note 2, supra), and Firebrass v. Pennant (note 3,
supra).
5 Regina v. Featherstone, 6 Cox. Cr. Cases 376 (1854) (larceny); Rex v. March,
1 Moody Cr. Cases 182 (1828, arson).6 Jordon v. Jordon, 52 Me. 320 (1864).
71 Q. B. D. 436 (1876).
s State v. Lankford, 6 Boyce (Del.) 594 (1917, infecting spouse with venerealdisease) ; Gross v. State, 135 Miss. 624 (1924, assault) ; People v. Meli, 193 N. Y. S.
365 (husband abetting in rape on wife) ; State v. Fulton, 149 N. C. 485 (slander);
State v. Oliver, 70 N. C. 60 (whipping wife).
9 Rex v. Masters, Sayer's Cases 122 (1754, libel) ; Regina v. Clarence, 16 Cox Cr.
Cases 511 (1888, husband infecting wife with gonorrhea).
10 8 Dowling's Practice Reports 630.
11 1 Q. B. D. 671 (1891).
12 State v. Oliver, 70 N. C. 60.
'3 Anderson v. Anderson, 11 Ky. 327 (1875). See Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323
1861).
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procedural difficulty, in the way of the wife's suit, was not present in cases
where the wife sued for torts committed against her separate equitable
property. 14 In such cases, she could sue without joining her husband with
her. Of course, the husband could assume control of any chose in action
accruing to the wife (except those pertaining to her separate estate) and
reduce them into possession by suit or dispose of such choses in action by
assignment or release, 15 even without the wife's consent. As for damages
indirectly suffered by the husband for injuries to the wife by strangers,
resulting in the loss of the wife's services, the husband could and had to sue
alone; the wife could not be joined.' 6
So much for cases where the spouses were plaintiffs. In the reverse
situation where the spouses are made defendants, the cases fall into two
groups, first, those where the wife committed a tort against the plaintiff
before marriage; secondly, where the wife committed the tort after marriage.
Bearing in mind that, upon marriage, all of the wife's property became
the husband's, 17 the common law rule, as to torts committed by the wife
before marriage, seems reasonable. It was well settled in those cases that
though the duty was substantively the wife's, the suit had to be brought
against the husband and wife jointly and judgment could be enforced against
the property of either spouse.1s However, if the husband died, the action
could be brought against the wife alone. 19 This indicates that coverture
afforded only a temporary, procedural disability or immunity from suit.
As for torts committed by the wife after marriage, in general, the husband
was not liable where the wife's acts were not done in his presence nor under
his advice or direction.20 However, though the husband could not be sued
alone for torts of the wife committed in his absence, he could be joined with
the wife as defendant. 2 1 In fact, in suits against the wife for such torts,
the husband had to be joined. 22
Where the wife's acts were done in the presence of the husband, the
earlier common law rule raised a presumption of coercion on the part of the
husband, rendering the wife a mere innocent agent.23 Even before married
women's statutes, this presumption began to find disfavor and to break
down. 24 The advent of the Married Woman's Statutes, which will be dealt
with at greater length hereafter, had a further destructive effect on this pre-
sumption of coercion, so that all that remains of it is that the wife is per-
mitted to show that she was in fact coerced; but the prima facie presumption
has well disappeared.25 Of course, where the husband directs or instigates
14 Willis v. White & Co., 150 N. C. 199 (1909) ; Adams v. Sater, 19 Ind. 418 (1862).
15 Ballard v. Russel, 33 Me. 196 (1851).
16 Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861) ; Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215; Matteson
v. N. Y. Central R. R., 35 N. Y. 487.
17 Jordon v. Jordon, (note 6 supra).
'8 Hawk v. Harmon, 5 Riney (Pa.) 43 (1812) where the court upheld the writ
even though it charged both spouses with a trespass in fact committed by the wife alone
before marriage. Also Hubble v. Fogartie, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 413 (1831).
19 Woodman v. Chapman, 1 Camp. 189 (1808).
20 Hinds v. Jones, 48 Me. 348 (1861) (tort of wife as executrix de son tort,
committed without husband's knowledge).
21 Fowler v. Chichester, 26 Ohio St. 9 (1874); Bell v. Bennett, 21 Ind. 427 (1863).
22 Whitmore v. Delano, 6 N. H. 543 (1834); Heckle v. Lurvey et ux 101 Mass.
344 (1869) ; Bell v. Bennett, supra note 21, at page 428.
23 Lee Commonwealth v. Burk, 11 Gray (Mass.) 437 (1858).
24 Lee State v. Shee, 13 R. I. 535; also Wagener et ux v. Bill et ux, 19 Barb. 321
(N. Y. 1855) where the court held that the presumption of coercion was only prima
facie and might be repelled, so that the case had to be submitted to the jury.
25 Blakeslee v. Tyler, 55 Conn. 397 (1887). But see Dressler v. State, 194 Ind.
8 (1923).
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the commission of a tort by the wife, he is liable even though the act is done
in his absence.20
Just as in the cases of torts committed by the wife before marriage, she
could be sued alone after the husband died, so she could be sued alone after
his death for torts committed by her after marriage (unless she was a mere
innocent agent) ; and likewise suit might be continued against the wife alone
where the husband died pending the prosecution of the suit against the
husband and wife jointly.27 Divorce after a tort committed by the wife
during marriage had a siimlar effect; the husband could not thereafter be
joined in a suit against the ex-wife.28
As for the liability of a wife after coverture for the torts of her servant
committed during the wife's coverture, it would seem that, the marriage rela-
tion no longer subsisting, the ex-wife should enjoy no greater immunity than
for her own direct torts. One Rhode Island case29 seems to go contra in
holding that the ex-wife is not liable for the torts of her servants committed
during her marriage. At first blush this decision would seem to indicate
that the court considered marriage as a substantive rather than a mere pro-
cedural incapacity. However, the court rests its decision on the argument
that there was no valid contract of agency between her and the servant during
the marriage and, therefore, no liability from any agency relationship can
arise. While the court undoubtedly is wrong in assuming that there can
be no liability as master without a valid contract subsisting between master
and servant, the emphasis which the court placed on this ground dispels the
notion that the court looked upon marriage as a permanent disability. It
seems a more proper explanation of the case to say that the court was really
stressing contractual disability during coverture, rather than pressing the
question as to the extent of the permanency of the wife's immunity from tort
liability because of the marital relationship.
With this general background of the legal incidents and attributes attach-
ing to the spouses in respect to third persons, let us now pursue our principal
inquiry,--the question of suits between the spouses themselves.
In theory, suits between husband and wife may be variously classified.
In point of time, four situations might be enumerated, viz.: (a) Suits
where the cause of action, if any, arose prior to marriage and suit was
brought during marriage; (b) Suits where the cause of action, if any, arose
before marriage and suit was brought after termination; (c) Suits where
the cause of action, if any, arose during marriage and suit was brought
during marriage; finally (d) Suits where the cause of action, if any, arose
during marriage and suit was brought after termination.
Another obvious classification of tort cases between spouses may be
based on the interest affected. Some torts affect property primarily, others
the person and still others affect both property and the person.
Further, suits may be in equity or at law, either for specific relief or for
ubstituted relief by way of damages.
The possible combinations are many. But while these classifications
should and would be helpful, there is a lamentable paucity of cases upon
many of the variations; especially are the cases few which deal with the
subject before the Married Women's Acts. Those few cases that are to
be found, moreover, usually fail to articulate any legal bearing which the
particular variation of the problem may have in deciding the particular case.
Finally, the individual importance of these elements (i. e. time of bringing
the action, place of suit, whether in equity or at law, etc.) varies greatly.
26 Handy v. Foley, 121 Mass. 259 (1876).
27 Baker v. Braslin, 16 R. I. 635 (1889).
28 Capel v. Powell, 17 Common Bench Reports 743 (New Series), (1870).
29 Ferguson v. Neilson, 17 R. I. 81 (1890).
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Therefore, whatever the merits of any classifications in determining what
should be the law, they will not be very useful in determining how the cases
actually have been decided. A rather convenient mode of approach will per-
haps be afforded by first seeing what the cases have held and then observing
the arguments relied on by the courts and the factors which consciously or
subconsciously influence the decisions of the courts.
Suits Between Spouses at Common Law, Before Married Women's Statutes
As we have seen in the discussion of suits between the wife and third
parties, there was always a procedural difficulty that attached to such suits
in that the husband had to-be joined with the wife in order for her to sue
or be sued.80 This same procedural difficulty, operating as an incident of
the unity theory, obviously was present (before the Married Women's Acts)
where suits were between the spouses. This difficulty disposed of the great
bulk of tort cases between spouses at common law, and served no doubt to
keep many cases from the courts. As Blackburn said 31 in 1876:
"It is not difficult to see why such an action has not been brought before.
There could be no question of bringing it except where the marriage was
dissolved by divorce for ... before dissolution of the marriage, the objection
on account of parties would of itself prevent the action."
However, even before the Married Women's Statutes, a more basic and
substantive ground was announced than this procedural difficulty, upon which
a denial of relief in suits between spouses might be rested. The first case
to announce the substantive grounds was Philips v. Barnet.32
A woman after divorce sued her former husband for alleged assaults
and batteries which occurred during coverture. No Married Women's Act
was yet in operation. The court held that the action would not lie. Black-
burn said:
"I was at first inclined to think, having regard to the old procedure and
form of pleas in abatement, that the reason why the wife could not sue
her husband was a difficulty as to parties; but I think that when one looks
at the matter more closely, the objection to the action is not merely with
regard to the parties, but a requirement of law founded upon the principle
that husband and wife are one person."
Field, who concurred with Blackburn, said:
"I think it clear that the real substantial ground why the wife can not
sue the husband, is not merely a difficulty in the procedure but the general
principle of the common law that husband and wife are one person."
Again in Abbott v. Abbott 33 a wife after a divorce sued her husband
for assaults and false imprisonment in an insane asylum, the acts having
been done during coverture. Here too there was no operative Married
Woman's Act. Peters, J., cited and followed Philips v. Barnet in denying
recovery. The court said:
"We are not convinced that it is desirable to have the law as plaintiff
contends it to be. There is no necessity for it .... The criminal courts are
open to her. She has the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, if unlawfully
restrained. As a last resort, if need be, she can prosecute at her husband's
expense, a suit for divorce.
"If the wife can sue husband, he can sue her. If an assault was actionable,
then would slander and libel and other torts be. Instead of settling, a divorce
30 Anderson v. Anderson, supra note 13; Hawk v. Harmon and Hubble v. Fogartie,
supra note 18.
31 Philips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436 (1876).
32 Id. See also Barnett v. Harshbarger, 105 Md. 411, 412.
83 67 Me. 304 (1877).
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would unsettle all matters between married parties. The private matters
of the whole period of married existence might be exposed by suits ...
With divorces as common as they are now-a-days, there would be new
harvests of litigation. If such a precedent was permitted, we do not see
why any wife surviving the husband, could not maintain a suit against his
executors or administrators . . . and this would add a new method by
which estates could be plundered."
Despite the fact that these cases were decided before Married Women's
Statutes, they have apparently acquired the position of leading cases and
their position is often referred to and is followed by the weight of authority
under the Married Women's Acts in cases (which we will discuss presently)
involving injuries to personality.
Married Women's Statutes As Affecting Property
"Enabling Acts," or "Married Women's Acts" or "Emancipation Acts"
of the nineteenth century were designed primarily to secure to married
women, a right to a separate estate, and to make this a legal estate. The
estates created by these statutes were modelled after the equitable separate
estate. However, most statutes have gone further and declare all property
acquired after marriage by married women to be their own, free from the
control of the husband, and free from liability for his debts. Many statutes
give married women a more or less unlimited power to convey or contract.34
34 The following extracts are typical examples of married women's statutes:
(a) Ind. Ann. Stat. (Bums, 1929) §8751:
"A married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own name against
any person or body corporate for damages for any injury to her person or character
the same as if she were sole; and the money recovered shall be her separate property,
and her husband, in such case, shall not be liable for costs."
(b) Kansas Comp. Laws of 1879 Ch. 62:
"The property, real and personal, which any woman in this state may own at
the time of her marriage and rents and profits thereof and any property coming to
her by descent, devise or bequest or gift of any person but her husband, shall remain
her sole and separate property notwithstanding her marriage, and not be subject to
disposal of her husband or liable for his debts.
"A married woman may bargain, sell and convey realty and personalty and enter
any contract with reference to same as any married man can do.
"Any married woman may carry on any trade or business and perform any labor
or services on her sole and separate account; and earnings shall be her sole and
separate property.
"A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were
unmarried."
(c) Iowa Code-Section 2202:
"A married woman may own in her own right, realty and personalty acquired by
descent, gift, or purchase, and manage, sell, convey and devise same by will to same
extent and in like manner that her husband can property belonging to him."
Section 2211:
"A wife may receive wages of her personal labor and maintain an action therefor
in her own name and hold same in her own right; and she may prosecute and defend
all actions at law and in equity for the preservation and protection of her rights and
property as if unmarried. Neither husband nor wife is liable for debts or liabilities
of the other incurred before marriage and except as herein otherwise declared, they
are not liable for the separate debts of the other; nor are wages, earnings or property
of either liable for separate debts of the other."
Section 2562:
"A married woman may in all cases sue and be sued without joining her husband
with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried, and an attachment or judgment
in such action shall be enforced by or against her as if she were a single woman."
(d) Maine R. S. 1857 c 61 Para. 3:
"A married woman is authorized to prosecute and defend suits at law or in equity
for the preservation and protection of her property, as if unmarried, or may do it
jointly with her husband."
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In general, most of the statutes of the various states have much in com
mon. Essentially, they all give married women a separate estate which is
legal. Beyond that there are differences which might be briefly summarized
as follows: (1) Some statutes allow married women to sue or be sued
only in respect to her separate estate; (2) Some statutes expressly preclude
the right to sue a spouse; (3) Some statutes don't allow married women to
sue or be sued by a third person alone in her own name for personal torts;
(4) Some statutes expressly give married women the same right to sue or
be sued as though they were sole; (5) Some statutes, in express terms say
that spouses may sue each other.
At any rate, to repeat, courts are almost entirely in accord under the
statutes in giving the wife enforceable property rights against the husband.
There is very little difficulty today in the way of laying down as a fairly
unanimous rule, the proposition that spouses may sue each other in respect
to property rights. If any difficulty at all is raised in these property cases,
it is only as to the question of whether such suit shall be brought at law35
or whether the remedy shall be sought in equity.3 6 Cases can be found
upholding, in suits by the wife against the husband, almost every kind of
property interest including suits to quiet title,3 7 suits to impose constructive
trusts, 38 actions of replevin, 40 waste, 41 and ejectment. 42
(e) Mississippi Code of 1906 Section 2517:
"Married women are fully emancipated from all disability on account of converture;
and the common law as to the disabilities of married women and its effect on the
property rights of the wife is totally abrogated, and marriage shall not impose any
disability or incapacity on wife as to ownership, acquisition or disposition of property
which she could lawfully do if she were not married; but every woman now married
or hereafter to be married, shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control,
use, and dispose of all property and to make any contract in reference thereto and to
bind herself personally and to sue and be sued, with all the rights and liabilities incident
thereto as if she were not married."
Section 2518:
"Husband and wife may sue each other."
(f) Mass. G. L. c. 209 Paragraphs 2, 4, 6:
"The common law disabilities of married women as to making of contracts are
removed so that they can contract, sue and be sued in the same manner as if single,
subject however to the limitation that contracts and suits between husband and wife
are not permissible, but stand on the same footing as heretofore."
(g) N. Y. Act of 1860 (Amended by Act of 1862): Section 7
"And any married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own name
for damages against any person or body corporate for any injury to her person or
character, the same as if she were sole."
(h) Pa. Act of June 8, 1893 P. L. 344 (Para. 3) as amended by Act of March 27,
1913, Pd. 14:
"Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly in all respects and in any
form of action and with the same effect and results as an unmarried person, but she
may not sue her husband except in a proceeding for divorce or in a proceeding to
protect and recover her separate property; nor may she be arrested or imprisoned for
her torts."
35 Howe v. Blander, 21 Vt. 315 (1849); Smith v. Gorman, 41 Me. 405 (1856);
Plotkin v. Plotkin, 125 Atl. (Del.) 455 (1924).
36 Minier v. Minier, 4 Lans. 421 (N. Y. 1871).
37 Porter v. Goble, 88 Iowa 565 (1893).
38 Heintz v. Heintz, 56 Tex. Civ. Appeals 403.
30 Healey v. Healey, 1 K. B. 938 (1915).
40 Howland v. Howland. 20 Hun 472 (N. Y. 1880).
41 Feiler v. Kear, 126 Pa. 470 (1889).
42 Smith v. Smith, 133 Atl. 860 (N. J. Eq. 1926).
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Similarly many states allow the husband to enforce property rights
as against the wife.43
The tort cases which afford the most difficulty and confusion since the
Married Women's Acts are those where the wrongful act affects the person
rather than property. To those cases we shall now turn our attention.
Tort Actions Between Spouses Since the Married Women's Acts to Vindicate
Rights of Personality
Since in most jurisdictions, it became settled at an early date that the
Married Women's Statutes gave the wife a right to sue in respect to her
separate property, an attempt was made to recover for injuries to personality
by classifying an action for damages for personal injuries as an action
dealing with the wife's separate property.
In Peters v. Peters44 a wife sued her husband for assaults and batteries
committed by the husband during marriage. The section of the code relied
on for recovery by the wife read:
"Should either husband or wife obtain possession or control of property
belonging to the other, either before or after marriage, the owner of the
property may maintain an action therefor, or for any right growing out of
same in the same manner and extent as if they were unmarried."
The wife claimed that a right to sue for an injury is property and that
where this right of action exists in favor of the wife, it is her property for
which she may sue.
The court quickly disposed of the wife's argument and held there could
be no recovery, saying that plaintiff assumed the very thing to be established,
i. e. that the right to sue is a property right. The court proceeded to interpret
the statute as inapplicable in cases of personal injuries.
The leading case on the question is perhaps Thompson v. Thompson. 43
There the question of whether the wife might recover from the husband
for personal intentional injuries was flatly raised. The wife sued her
husband for assaults during marriage. The court of the District of Columbia
overruled the wife's demurrer to the husband's plea of coverture of the wife.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment below
was affirmed. Justice Day said:
"The statute46 was not intended to give a right of action against the
husband, but to allow the wife to maintain actions of tort which at common
law must be brought in the joint names of herself and husband."
In the course of the opinion, the court referred to Philips and Barnet
with approval.
As was intimated in the discussion of that case, earlier in this paper, the
rule laid down in that case seems to be the great weight of authority after
the Statutes in personal injuries cases. Thompson v. Thompson no doubt
did much to lend it further strength, judging from the number of cases and
jurisdictions which cite and follow Thompson and Thompson, invariably
mentioning Philips v. Barnet and Abbott v. Abbott. Numerous cases where
43 Lombard v. Morse, 155 Mass. 136 (1891-to enforce a trust); Niles v. Niles,
143 Ky. 94 (1911-partition) : Mason v. Mason, 66 Hun 386 ( 1892-conversion); Notes
v. Synder, 4 F. (2nd) 426 (1925-replevin).
44 42 Iowa 182 (1875) ; Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170 in accord. See also Cardamone
v. Cardamone, 9 D. & C. 723.
45 218 U. S. 611 (1910).
46 A typical one (see supra, note 34).
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the wife sued the husband for assaults and batteries are in accord 47 with
the Thompson case. In addition, the same rule has been followed in actions
for false imprisonment,4 8 slander, 49 libel5 ° and negligence.
51 New York52
and Pennsylvania 53 are among the leading states following the view.
Minority View As To Torts Affecting the Person
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority, in point of number and
importance of jurisdictions, which denies recovery between spouses for
personal wrongs, there is a definite minority of jurisdictions which go the
whole way of allowing recovery in cases of torts affecting the person as
well as for torts in respect to property. Connecticut is the principal state
which gives relief for personal wrongs not only when intentional5 4 but also
when the defendant husband injured the wife through negligence. 55
Taking the same stand as this state are Alabama,56 Arkansas, 57 North
Carolina,58 Oklahoma,5 9 South Carolina 0 and Wisconsin.51
We shall presently attempt to indicate the reasoning of the minority as
well as the majority jurisdictions, in an effort to explain the divergency of
views. At this point, the writer desires to indicate merely that there is a
decided minority which does allow recovery in cases of torts affecting the
person, be they intentional or negligent.
Two more situations remain to be alluded to in outlining the trend of the
law in tort cases involving the marital status. First, how far is an employer
of a spouse liable to the other spouse for an injury inflicted by the employee
spouse on the other during the course of employment? Second, how far is
one spouse vicariously liable to the other for torts committed by agents of
the defendant spouse?
Liability of Employer of One Spouse for Torts Inflicted on Other by the
Employee Spouse
With the exception of New York,6 2 no states which refuse to allow
recovery for personal injuries as between the spouses directly, permit a
spouse to recover from the employer of the spouse who inflicted the injury.
The three principal cases which thus deny recovery against the employer
47Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32; Dishon v. Dishon, 187 Ky. 497; Libby v. Berry,
74 Me. 286; Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427; Brandfield v. Brandfield, 117 Mich. 80;
Smith v. Smith, 14 D. & C. 466 (Pa. 1926) ; Speer v. Sykes, 102 Tex. 451.
48 Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200.
49 Clark v. Clark, 11 Fed. (2nd.) 871.
50 Faris v. Hope, 298 Fed. 727.
51 Blickenstaff v. Blickenstaff, 167 N. E. 146, (Ind. App. 1929); Furstenburg v.
Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247; Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61; Woltman v. Woltman, 153
Minn. 217.
52 Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882) reversing 27 Hun 26 where the wife
recovered.
53 Smith v. Smith, supra note 47.
54 Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42 (1914-assault and battery).
55 Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583 (1925).
56 Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41 (1917 assault).
57 Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167 (1916 where the court went so far as to
allow the wife's administrator to recover from the husband for killing the wife.)
58 Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566 (nerligence).
59 42 Okla. 124 (assault and battery 1914).
60 Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S. C. 45 (assault 1922).
61 Moore v. Moore, 191 Wis. 232 (negligence).
62 Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., 164 N. E. 42.
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are Maine v. Maine and Sons ;63 Riser v. Riser ;64 and Emerson v. Western
Seed and I. Co.
65
In all three cases a wife sued the husband's employer for injuries
inflicted by the husband while driving a car for the employer. The theory
of each case was negligence. Recovery was denied in each case, each court
resting its decision on two propositions. First, that the employer is liable
only if the employee is liable. This assumption, that a principal is never
liable unless the agent is, is not always true. For example, the case of an
innocent agent who acts upon the direction of the principal is overlooked.
The second argument relied on by the courts in these cases, is perhaps more
significant; that is that a recovery against the employer would give the
latter a right over against the employee; and thus ultimately the burden is
on the husband, so that the wife would be accomplishing indirectly what
she couldn't do directly.
As pointed out above,00 New York state is in accord with the majority
in allowing recovery in suits between spouses in cases affecting property.
Likewise, New York is with the majority in denying recovery in direct
suits between spouses for personal injuries.67 Yet curiously enough, New
York has refused to follow the majority in the cases of suits against the
employer, and instead has permitted recovery.
In Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co., a wife sued the husband's employer
for injuries sustained through the husband's negligent operation of a car
while in the defendant's employment. The trial court refused recovery.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment was reversed. Cardozo
in deciding in favor of the wife said:
"The disability of wife or husband to maintain an action against the
other for injuries to the person is not a disability to maintain a like action
against the other's principal or master. . . . A trespass, negligent or
willful upon the person of a wife does not cease to be an unlawful act
though the law exempts the husband from liability for damage. Others
may not hide behind the skirts of his immunity. .
"We are told that in the long run the consequences of upholding an
action against the master may be to cast the burden on the husband, since
the master, if not personally at fault, has a remedy over. The consequence
may be admitted without admitting its significance as a determining factor
in the solution of the problem. . . . Domestic Relations Law . .
is explicit that 'A married woman has a right of action for an injury to
her person or property or character as if unmarried.' By authority and
tradition an exception has been engrafted upon this rule where the husband
is defendant. We are not at liberty to extend it by dubious construction."
As for suits by one spouse against the employer of the other in the
minority of jurisdictions which allow direct suits for personal injuries
between the spouses, the writer was unable to find a single case raising this
question of recovery against the employer. However, there being recovery
between spouses in direct suits, for personal injuries, it would seem an
a fortiori conclusion that suits by a spouse against the employer of the
other would be permitted in the minority jurisdictions.
63 198 Iowa 1278 (1924).
64240 Mich. 402 (1927).
65 116 Neb. 180 (1927).
06 Minier v. Minier, supra note 36.
67 Schultz v. Schultz, supra note 52.
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Suit Against a Spouse for Vicarious Liability for Personal Injuries
Inflicted by Servants of the Defendant Spouse
Here again there is a lamentable paucity of cases. Only one case could
be found by the writer dealing with this situation. In Waite v. Pierce,68
a wife sued her husband for injuries inflicted by one of the husband's
servants through the negligent operation of a car, while in the course of
his employment. The trial court denied recovery, but was reversed. It
must be noted, however, that Wisconsin is one of the minority jurisdictions
which allow direct recovery against a spouse for direct personal injuries.6 9
Therefore, the effect of this decision on future cases in the majority juris-
dictions is dubious, perhaps even in New York, where despite the result
in Schubert v. Schubert Wagon Co.,70 Cardozo simultaneously recognized
the husband's immunity from liability when he said:
"By authority and tradition, an exception has been engrafted upon this
rule (i. e., that the wife can sue as if unmarried) where the husband is
defendant."
Reasoning Of, and Factors Influencing the Courts
We have seen that, broadly speaking, the majority of states refuse
recovery for personal injuries in suits between spouses. Also we have seen
that a decided minority view does allow recovery. Why the divergency?
Naturally enough, since all the jurisdictions have statutes on the subject,
the courts invariably use as one haven of refuge the explanation that "statu-
tory interpretation and construction" require the particular result reached
in the given jurisdiction. It is submitted, however, that this explanation,
if it explains anything, merely describes the result and not the reason for
the result reached.
As indicated earlier in this paper, the statutes in the various states are
very much the same. Yet, despite similar statutes, they are "construed"
and "interpreted" differently. For example, New York, which denies71
recovery, and North Carolina 72 and Wisconsin,7 3 which allow recovery,
have statutes with almost identical wording.
The usual argument on the one hand is that unless a statute expressly
gives the wife a remedy against the husband, the common law disability
must continue. On the other hand, the minority asserts that the statutes
have completely altered the civil basis of marriage, that the unity conception
of the common law has been abrogated and that the question is purely one
of removing a disability.
Again in Mississippi, the statute74 says expressly: "Husband and wife
may sue each other." Yet Mississippi courts in accord with the majority
have refused to allow recovery. In Austin v. Austin 75 the court "inter-
preted" the statute as removing only procedural difficulties; that the statute
did not create substantive rights and that the inexistence of a substantive
right of action continued.
To repeat, therefore, it would seem that "statutory interpretation and
construction" does not do more than describe the result which the courts
desire to reach.
68 191 Wis. 202.
69 Moore v. Moore, supra note 61.
70 Supra note 62.
71 Schultz v. Schultz, supra note 52.
72 Roberts v. Roberts, supra note 58.
73 Moore v. Moore, supra note 61.
74 Supra note 34 (e) Section 2518.
75 136 Miss. 61.
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One factor which may be important in determining the view of a par-
ticular jurisdiction may be found in the type of relief sought in the earlier
marital cases in that jurisdiction. For example, Drake v. Drake was one
of the early cases in Minnesota where a wife was sued by her husband under
a statute. There the husband went to equity and prayed the court to enjoin
the wife's nagging. In addition to the influence of Thompson and Thomp-
son,70 the Minnesota court obviously faced other considerations. The
difficulties in the way of enforcing an injunction if granted and the possible
ridicule which might be involved in restraining the wife's nagging may well
have influenced the court in denying relief. To repeat, therefore, wherever
the cases of first impression in any particular jurisdiction have sought
equitable relief as here, it is easy to see why such jurisdictions have followed
Thompson v. Thompson.
The particular variation of the problem (i. e., when the cause of action
arose, when suit was brought, etc.) is occasionally a determinative factor,
as in a recent Pennsylvania case. 77 There a single woman sued a man for
personal injuries. Before trial the parties married. The husband then
moved for a nonsuit. The court refused the nonsuit and said that the plain-
tiff's disability, having arisen after the cause of action, was not permanent;
that it merely put the plaintiff under a procedural disability. The result
was, said the court, that the proceedings were merely suspended indefinitely
until the procedural obstacle was removed by the husband's death or divorce.
Meanwhile, the court chose to keep the cause of action hanging in the air,
so to speak, like Mohamet's coffin, rather than to grant a nonsuit. Nor
could laches run, under the court's holding, because until the disability
terminated the plaintiff was legally unable to sue.
This case illustrates one of the rare instances of a court placing full
reliance on the factual variation of the problem (here that the disability
supervened after the cause of action had already accrued). On the whole,
however, as indicated earlier in this paper, the courts do not stress the
variation as a deciding factor of the cases.
A fear of fraud78 is often relied upon by the courts in denying recovery.
The argument is advanced that if the wife is allowed to recover, it would
provide an easy way for women to plunder the estates of deceased husbands.,
Still another common argument is that there is no necessity for giving
married women a right to sue for damages. 79 It is pointed out that the
criminal courts are open to the wife for relief, as well as writs of habeas
corpus in cases of unlawful restraints; and in addition, there is, as a last
resort, the right to sue for divorce. The soundness of this reasoning is
perhaps to be questioned in view of the many cases of negligence where
none of these remedies may be available. Besides many property rights are
protected by criminal courts. Yet the majority of jurisdictions permit tort
suits between spouses in such cases despite possible relief from the criminal
courts.
Another influence in the decisions can be traced to the old, pre-married-
women's-statutes cases like Philips v. Barnet and Abbott v. Abbott.
Invariably the courts allude to the "sound doctrine laid down in Philips v.
Barnet" with approval, despite the fact that those cases ought no longer be
determinative of the wife's rights in view of the fact that no married
women's statutes were involved there.
76 Supra note 45.
77 Lipschutz v. Kohl, 16 D. & C. 386 (Pa.). But see Hennenger v. Lomas, 145
Ind. 287, 294 (1896).
78 Supra note 33, Abbott v. Abbott.
79 Id.
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The most frequently stressed argument, and the one most earnestly urged,
in denying recovery, is that recovery in tort actions between spouses for
personal injuries would disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony of the
home.80
The minority, which does allow relief in personal injury cases, find their
greatest strength (beyond the argument of "statutory interpetation and con-
struction") in attacking this last named argument about "disruption of
domestic tranquility." It is first pointed out that suits to protect property
interests may be and often are more acrimonious and disturbing to domestic
peace than cases for personal injuries. Yet, as pointed out above, there is
substantial unanimity in allowing property suits. If the objection be sound
at all, it is argued, it should serve to close the door to all suits between
spouses, including those to protect property.8 '
Secondly, the minority argues, if the infliction of personal injuries by
one spouse upon the other, provokes in the other a desire to sue, there can
be little domestic tranquility left, to be preserved.8 2 And it has further
been pointed out that even if there be validity to the view that such suits
do disrupt domestic peace, the objection is no longer present where the suit
is brought after coverture is terminated, or where the real party is an
employer, or insurer of the tortious spouse. In such cases, presumably,
both spouses, far from being at odds, are in full accord. In fact, a stronger
argument against recovery in such case, is not "disruption of domestic peace,"
but rather the danger of "domestic collusion."'8 3
No doubt there is much to be said in favor of the objections to the
majority's argument of "disruption of domestic peace." On the other hand,
the writer submits that it would be undesirable to permit spouses to sue
each other for every trivial touching, or for every casual negligent injury
where the consequences are not particularly serious. In other words, the
marriage relationship should be deemed to confer certain limited privileges
and immunities in respect to acts, that as between strangers would be
actionable. "Consent," "common purpose," "voluntary assumption of risk"
and like doctrines ought to be applied fairly liberally in favor of the defendant
spouse. While the cases don't openly assert as a basis for their decision,
a fear of too many suits by spouses for trivialities, it is submitted that this
is perhaps the basis for the majority's refusal of relief. As suggested above,
a firm adherence to and consistent application of the doctrines of "consent,"
"common purpose," etc., will serve to minimize fear of suits for trivialities.
Beyond that, however, in view of the definite emancipation of women
in respect to property rights, and in view of the weakness of the majority's
mainstay--"disruption of domestic harmony"-it is subimitted that modem
courts should cease to pay lip-service to the common law doctrines announced
by Philips v. Barnet. And doubts in "interpretation and construction" of
statutes should be resolved in favor of emancipation, with a caution, to
repeat, on the part of the courts to pay due regard to the considerations of
80 Logendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 367 (N. Y. 1863).
81 Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42.
82 Schultz v. Schultz, 27 Hun 6, overruled later in 89 N. Y. 644 by memorandum
opinion.
83 See Marks v. Carne, 2 K. B. 516-1909, also see Fidelity & Gas. Co. v. Marchand,
4 Dominion Law Reports 157 (1924). In the latter case, a father negligently ran over
and injured his son. The father then appointed a tutor to sue him (the father) on
behalf of the son. Upon recovery by the tutor, the father sued the Insurance Company
to be indemnified. On appeal, a judgment for recovery was reversed. This case serves
to show the great possibilities of domestic collusion.
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"econsent," "common purpose," etc., as carrying a peculiarly significant
importance wherever marital status is involved.
It is true that the determination of individual cases may raise difficulties
in determining whether a particular offense alleged to have been committed
by a defendant spouse has exceeded the limits up to which he is privileged.
However, this is a factual difficulty merely which offers no greater hazards
than many other factual problems in all fields of law. It is to be hoped
that the view of the minority will gain added favor.
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